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COMPETITION, RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
1XING LU, 2HAIYAN YIN
1,2Indiana University South Bend
Abstract - This paper hypothesizes that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) as an incentive mechanism varies
positively with the degree of competition a firm faces. I utilize the model proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) to show that the level of competition affects RPE use. While previous research tends to focus
on the characteristics of top executives, implying that CEOs are in the driver’s seat in their relationship with firms, this paper
examines firm characteristics since CEO characteristics may reflect firm needs and current condition. The tests use two
alternative measures of CEO compensation: cash compensation and total compensation. By focusing on firm characteristics,
I find evidence that partially supports the hypothesis. The evidence shows strong supports for RPE use in CEOs’ cash
compensation.
I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE
REVIEW
The main premise of relative performance evaluation 
(RPE) holds that the compensation of a risk-averse
executive should only depend on the component of 
firm performance that is unrelated to peer firms’
performance (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982 and Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1982). Executives should be
insulated from shocks outside their control.
Otherwise, they would need to be compensated for
bearing the additional risk. Implementation of RPE
thus requires an understanding of the correlation of 
firm performance with peer performance. In this
paper I seek to examine if this co-movement depends
on firm-specific characteristics, such as the level of 
competition a firm faces in its industry.
1.1 RPE and CEO Compensation
Holmstrom (1982) suggests that the market or 
industry component of a firm’s returns should be
removed from the compensation package since
executives cannot affect the overall market by their 
actions and it is costly for executives to bear the
related risks.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that RPE is not an 
important source of managerial incentives. Barro and
Barro (1990), Joh (1999), and Janakiraman, Lambert,
and Larcker (1992) find that compensation increases
with peer firm performance. Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) find the compensation of executives in more
competitive industries exhibits less relative
performance evaluation. Although they take
competition level into account, they find very
surprising results.
Aggarwal and Samick (1999) argue that the extent of 
RPE use is limited by strategic interactions. They
demonstrate that the optimal contract compensates
the manager positively for both individual as well as
peer firm performance; and this contract has the
effect of softening competition. They argue that
including RPE in the incentive plan will encourage
rival managers to engage in excess competition and
therefore decrease the returns to shareholders, as
such. This implies that RPE use should be lower in 
oligopolistic industries.
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) focus on the ability of 
executives to “undo” excessive market risk. Although 
there is little RPE for the average executive, they find
strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and
executives with less financial wealth. Oyer (2004) 
posits a similar conclusion that an absence of RPE is
optimal if the CEO’s reservation wages from outside
employment opportunities vary with the economy.
Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) find support
for Oyer’s theory. They argue that the absence of 
RPE in compensation contracts of respected CEOs is
because firms don’t want to take the risk of losing
those CEOs to their rivals. Their conclusions are
based solely on the executive’s perspective. A
complete story needs to take into account the
company’s perspective also.
When board members make the CEO hiring decision,
they are likely to consider the firm’s needs and
condition. For example, a large and successful firm is
likely to hire a CEO with experience and reputation 
and pay them more than CEOs of smaller firms. So I 
examine whether the use of RPE is systematically
related to certain firm characteristics.
1.2 RPE and Competition
There are several reasons for the paucity of evidence
supporting RPE's descriptive validity. Janakiraman et
al. (1992) speculate that firms may find it
prohibitively costly to construct a measure that filters
out the common component; for example, when it is
difficult to identify the firm's peers or when the peer 
group changes frequently. They also suggest that
firms may not necessarily consider the common 
factors to be noise that should be eliminated. For 
example, firms may find it beneficial to encourage
executives to anticipate and adapt to changes in their 
environment that affect reported performance. Dye
(1992) hypothesizes that firms may not use RPE
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
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because it provides perverse incentives when 
executives are able to make investments across
different industries. He shows that the use of RPE is
optimal when the CEO is not allowed to invest
outside of his industry, or when the number of 
industries (or projects) over which the CEO can 
choose becomes very large.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the
benefits of RPE are likely to be context specific. Kim
(1996) recognizes the contextual nature of RPE and
hypothesizes that the level of competition in the
industry affects its usefulness. Reasoning that peer 
group performance in a competitive environment is
more likely to yield relevant information on the
common factors facing executives, he predicts that
RPE is likely to be useful in the evaluation of CEOs
operating in highly competitive industries. Kim
(1996) finds a significant negative relation between
changes in CEO compensation and changes in 
industry-level accounting earnings in high-
competition industries, but not in low-competition 
industries. This finding is consistent with RPE being
used to evaluate CEOs in highly competitive
industries. DeFond and Park (1998) also suggest that
the lack of support for RPE in prior studies results
from not considering the effects of competition. In 
this paper, I use the Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) as the proxy for degree of competition within 
each industry.
1.3 CEO Compensation Measures
Both total compensation and cash compensation are
used to evaluate the efficacy of RPE. I use cash 
compensation for three reasons. First, it sidesteps the
measurement error associated with valuing stock 
options. Second, Albuquerque (2006) studies the use
of RPE across the main components of pay and finds
that the strongest evidence supporting RPE comes
from the salary and bonus component. Core and Guay
(1999) show that stock may be granted for reasons
unrelated to RPE. For example, since stock option
grants require no contemporaneous cash payout,
firms with cash constraints may use these forms of 
compensation as a substitute for cash pay (Yermack,
1995; Dechow et al.,1996). Using cash compensation 
has the advantage that it is paid every year, while
equity compensation is paid at irregular intervals.
Therefore, cash compensation arguably provides a
better measure for the amount of compensation 
change due to RPE use.
II. MODEL AND VARIABLES
In this section, I use the mechanism based on the
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, henceforth HM) 
framework and hypothesize that the level of 
competition affects a firm’s use of RPE to 
compensate top executives. So the main hypothesis of 
this paper is that firms in more competitive industries
will make more use of RPE in top executive pay.
To explain this mechanism, and as a basis for the
empirical specification below, I restate the main 
result in HM. In HM, it is assumed that CEO
compensation contract is of the form
wi=α0+α1z+α2y, where wi is the total compensation 
of firm i’s CEO, z is a measure of firm i’s
performance, y is an equivalent performance measure
for the firm’s peers with variance σ2y. The constant
α1 and α2 represent the sensitivities of compensation 
to own and peer performance, respectively, and α0 is
the fixed component of the contract. Firm
performance is given by z = e + x where e is a
measure of effort and x is a random variable with 
variance σ2x. The effort choice e and the random
variable x are unobservable and hence non-
contractible. The CEO’s preferences over pay and
effort are given by U (w,e) = -exp-γ[w-C(e)], where γ
is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and C(e) =
(ke2)/2 is a function that describes the monetary
disutility of effort. Assuming that z and y are jointly
normally distributed, HM show that the optimal
values of the performance sensitivities α1 and α2
chosen by the a firm satisfy the conditions:
where ρ is the correlation between firm and peer 
performance and β = Cov (x , y) / σ2y is the slope
coefficient from regressing firm performance on peer 
(industry) performance, referred to throughout the
paper as firm-β. The first equation indicates that the
optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity α1 decreases
with risk aversion, effort cost, and idiosyncratic
variance. The second equation describes a firm’s use
of relative performance evaluation as the ratio α2 / α1
= -β. In particular, given α1 > 0 and β > 0, an increase
in the peer group performance that is not
accompanied by an increase in firm performance
leads to a decrease in CEO compensation.
I hypothesize that firm β is higher for firms in more
competitive industries and, given (2) and the
definition of RPE, so is RPE use. I measure the
degree of competition faced by a firm inversely by
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of industry
concentration.
A. Empirical Specification
The general empirical specification employed in the
paper is:
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
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(3)
Wit represents the compensation of the CEO at firm i Firm-βit is the time t slope coefficient of regressing
during time period t. Retit is firm performance, firm i’s past performance on its peer performance.
measured the stock return. Retpt is Peer For firm size, I use two the natural log of total sales. I
performance,
as
measured by firm’s industry average use the data from Compustat for the firm age，
stock return (excluding firm i). Varit represents firm which is defined by the number of years since the
i’s idiosyncratic variance with respect to the peer firm has shares outstanding in the stock market. Other 
group performance at time t. I measure the degree of control variables include industry dummy and year
Competition by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index dummy to control for the fixed effects from different
(HHI). High (low) levels of HHI indicate high (low) industry and time period.
industry concentration and low (high) competition.
In Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999a):
According to the regression model (3), the own and peer pay-performance sensitivities for CEO of firm i at time
t are α1 and α2, respectively:
And RPE is the ratio of peer to own-firm performance sensitivity:
I test whether Firm-β is significantly higher for firms in highly competitive industry and also whether Firm-β
impacts RPE. Formally, and as in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), the impact of Firm-β on RPE is tested with
against the alternative hypothesis that ә(α2 / α1) / әβit < 0. This alternative hypothesis states that firms with 
higher β are associated with a higher level of RPE. A negative derivative implies a larger negative weight on
peer performance (provided α2 < 0) relative to own-firm sensitivity which corresponds to more RPE.
I have the main hypothesis of this paper tested with:
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
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III. SAMPLE AND DATA
I use the Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database for
CEO compensation data. The financial data is
obtained from Compustat and the stock return data is
obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP).
From the original sample, I remove observations with 
missing Compustat financial data, industry
classification, peer returns, firm-βand idiosyncratic
variance data (these data are defined below). The
final sample contains 20400 CEO-year observations
during the period from year 1994 to 2005.
3.1 Variable Definition
This section briefly defines some of the variables
used in the tests. Please refer to Table 1 for a detailed 
definition of the variables used in the tests.
The first measure of CEO compensation is the total
annual compensation. Total annual compensation is
the sum of the following components: (i) cash 
compensation, measured as the sum of salary, bonus
and other annual compensation; (ii) equity
compensation, measured as the value of restricted 
stocks and the Black-Scholes value of stock options
granted during the year. I measure total annual flow
compensation in real terms (base January/1994 for
CPI).
Valuing options using Black-Scholes is problematic
as it assumes that CEOs can freely trade the firm’s
stock. As this assumption does not hold in general
and in order to avoid potential measurement
problems, I use the cash component of pay as an 
alternative measure, which includes salary, bonus,
and other annual compensation. The revaluation of 
these securities previously granted is mostly driven 
by the firm’s own performance and is consequently
independent of relative performance (see for example
Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman 
(1998), and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a)).
I measure annual performance for both the firm and a
peer group using annual compounded stock returns
from the CRSP monthly tapes. Following
Albuquerque (2006) the peer group performance is
the average stock return on a group of peer firms.
The firm-β and idiosyncratic variance are calculated 
in the following manner. Firm-β is the slope
coefficient of regressing firm stock return on the
firm’s peer group stock return. The peer group is
constructed by 2-digit SIC code from CompuStat.
The idiosyncratic risk is the error variance from this
regression.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated each 
year as the sum of the squared market share (using
sales) for each firm in the same 2-digit primary SIC
code. Firm size is measured as the natural log of 
sales, in constant 1994 dollars. Firm age is measured 
by the number of years in which the firm has shares
outstanding in the public market.
Besides the firm characteristics mentioned above, I 
also include CEO tenure to control for CEO
characteristics and two other dummy variables to 
control for the industry fixed effect and time effect.
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the entire
sample and for the subsamples of high- and low-HHI
firms. High (low) HHI firms are defined as firms
whose level of HHI is above (below) the median 
value across all firms for the year.
I first describe the characteristics of firms analyzed
using the full sample. The real cash compensation 
(salary, bonus and other annual) and total
compensation (plus long term incentive plans, stock
and option grants) average $1,347,000 and
$4,635,000, respectively. Table 2 shows total
compensation is highly skewed with mean 
compensation ($4,635,000) considerably higher than 
median compensation ($2,145,000), with equity
compensation (mean $3,288,000 / median 
$1,207,000) component contributing heavily to the
skewness. Thus, we use the log of total compensation 
in the regression model. This mitigates the problems
resulting from extreme skewness and from a possible
nonlinear relation between pay and performance
(Murphy (1999)). The average continuously
compounded annual real stock return in the sample is
19.3%. The average firm has real sales of MM $501.
The mean (median) level of HHI is 0.6 (0.4). The
average firm has a β of 0.79, monthly idiosyncratic
variance of 0.02, and firm age of 32 years.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the two sub-
samples: high- and low-HHI firms. Note that all the
differences of means (t-test) between high and low-
HHI firms are statistically significant at the one
percent level, except for idiosyncratic variance.
Table 2 shows firms with high HHI have higher 
realized firm (mean 21%, median 11.8%) than firms
in more competitive industry (mean 17.9%, median 
10.3%). Hi-HHI firms have higher mean peer 
performance but lower median peer performance than 
low-HHI firms. CEOs of high-HHI firms receive
more cash compensation (mean $1,405,000 median 
$951,000) than low-HHI firms (mean $1,291,000,
median $931,000).
High-HHI firms exhibit higher firm-β than low-HHI
firms. This difference, which suggests that low-HHI
firms have less informative benchmarks to capture
external shocks, is inconsistent to our hypothesis.
This difference in firm-β across firms with different
levels of HHI is inconsistent to our mechanism
connecting HHI to RPE use. Below we will test the
impact of firm-β on RPE.
4.2 Regression Results
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of estimating
equation 3 and Panel B presents the tests to
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
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hypotheses above. The regression model is estimated 
using OLS.
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates when the
CEO compensation is defined in two ways: the total
compensation and cash compensation. In both
regressions, we have controlled for CEO
characteristics, industry fixed effect, and time fixed 
effect. We look at the regression results using total
compensation as dependent variable at first. We focus
first on the coefficients of own-firm performance
interacted with. The coefficient of firm size is
statistically significant but shows sign inconsistent to
our hypothesis. The coefficient of own-firm
performance interacted with HHI shows a negative
sign but statistically insignificant. The coefficients of 
peer group performance interacted with firm size, and
HHI are all statistically insignificant. Firm age, as a
control variable, shows a predicted positive effect on
total compensation and is statistically significant.
Similar results are realized from the regression using
cash compensation as the measure for CEO
compensation.
4.3 Test of Hypothesis
The significance of the estimated coefficients
associated with peer performance (p−value of 0.01 in 
row 2 of Panel B) reveals that firm characteristics are
significant in determining the weight firms put on 
peer performance.
In panel B, if using total compensation, the test
results show no evidence consistent with our 
hypothesis. However, if we use cash compensation as
the dependent variable, the results provide strong
support to our hypothesis.
The last column in panel B of Table 3 shows a
negative relationship (-0.45) between firm-β and
RPE. It shows that there is a strong correlation 
between firm-βand RPE use. This relationship is
significant at 1% level (p-value 0.004) and consistent
with our hypothesis. Test results from equation (5)
shows that HHI level is negatively correlated with 
RPE use. HHI effect on RPE use is significant at 5%
level (p-value = 0.05). It supports our hypothesis that
RPE use is positively correlated with degree of 
competition. When estimating a predicted value of 
RPE use, it is negative (-8.93) and significant at 10%
level. The huge difference in significance between
using cash compensation and total compensation is
consistent with Core and Guay’s (1999) finding.
By examining the correlation between RPE use and
cash compensation, the test results provide partial
support for the use of RPE. These results also show
that the level of competition is a determining factor to
the RPE use.
CONCLUSION
By following HM (1987) and Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) models, I test the relationship between RPE
use and the level of competition. The model reveals
evidence showing firms in highly competitive
industry are likely to use more RPE in their CEO
compensation plans. The RPE use is significant in 
CEO’s cash compensation, while it is not significant
in the CEO’s equity compensation. A possible
explanation is equity compensation can be granted for
reasons unrelated to RPE. (Core and Guay, 1999).
In considering future research, although it may be
very time consuming to collect CEO data such as
CEO age and wealth, including such CEO
characteristics in the regression would help us to have
a better control on CEO characteristics. Furthermore,
as we have seen, the firm size and CEO equity
compensation is surprisingly larger in the low-HHI
group than those in the hi-HHI group. I will further 
explore the difference in firm characteristics.
REFERENCES
[1] Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Samwick. Andrew A. "Executive
Compensation, Relative Performance Evaluation, and
Strategic Competition: Theory and Evidence." Volume 54
Issue 6 Page 1999-2043, December 1999
[2] Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Samwick. Andrew A. “The Other
Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive
Compensation” Journal of Political Economics 1999 Vol. 107
No. 1
[3] Albuquerque, Ana M. (2006) “Who Are Your Peers? A Study
of Relative Performance Evaluation,” Working paper, Boston
University.
[4] Antle, Rick, and Smith, Abbie. "An Empirical Investigation
of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate
Executives." Journal of Accounting Research, 24 (Spring
1986): 1-39.
[5] Baiman S, Demski J, “Economically Optimal Performance
Evaluation and Control Systems”, Journal of Accounting
Research, Vol. 18, Studies on Economic Consequences of 
Financial and Managerial Accounting: Effects on Corporate
Incentives and Decisions (1980), pp. 184-220
[6] Barro, Jason R., and Barro, Robert J. "Pay, Performance, and
Turnover of Bank CEOs." Journal of labor Econ. 8 (October
1990): 448-81.
[7] Core, John E. and Wayne R. Guay (1999), “The Use of 
Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Incentive Levels,” Journal
of Accounting and Economics 28:151-184.
[8] Dechow, P., Hutton, A., Sloan, R., 1996. Economic
consequences of accounting for stock based compensation.
Journal of Accounting Research 34, 1-20.
[9] M.L. DeFond, C.W. Park, The effect of competition on CEO
turnover, Journal of Accounting and Economics 27 (1999) 
35-56
[10] Diamond, Verrecchia, “Optimal Managerial Contracts and
Equilibrium Security Prices”, The Journal of Finance, Vol.
37, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual
Meeting of the American Finance Association, Washington,
D.C., December 28-30, 1981 (May, 1982), pp. 275-287
[11] Garen, John E. "Executive Compensation and Principal-
Agent Theory." J.P.E. 102 (December 1994): 1175-99.
[12] Gerald Garvey, Todd Milbourn. “Incentive Compensation
When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of 
Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section” The
Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Aug., 2003), pp. 1557-
1581
[13] Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin J. "Relative
Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers" Indus,
and Labor Relations Rev. 43 (suppl.; February 1990): S30-
S51.
[14] Gould, W. W. "Quantile Regression with Bootstrapped
Standard Errors." Stata Tech. Bull. 9 (1992): 19-21.
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
35
                                                            
 
        
 
 
           
        
         
       
 
         
          
 
        
        
        
       
     
         
        
      
     
        
           
       
        
       
       
       
    
         
      
   
          
     
     
          
        
     
      
        
   
         
           
        
       
         
        
 
          
       
      
          
         





        
 
International Journal of Management and Applied Science, ISSN: 2394-7926 Volume-3, Issue-2, Feb.-2017
http://iraj.in
[15] Hall, Brian J., and Liebman, leffrey B. "Are CEOs Really
Paid like Bureaucrats?" Q.J.E 113 (August 1998'): 653-91.
[16] Haubrich, Joseph G. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and
the Principal-Agent Problem." J.P.E 102 (April 1994): 258-
76.
[17] Holmstrom, Bengt. “Moral Hazard in Teams” The Bell
Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp.
324-340
[18] Holmstrom, Bengt. "Moral Hazard and Observability." The
Bell Journal of Economics. 10 (Spring 1979): 74-91.
[19] Holmstrom, Bengt, and Milgrom, Paul. "Aggregation and
Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives."
Econometrica 55 (March 1987): 303-28.
[20] Janakiraman, Surya N.; Lambert, Richard A.; and Larcker,
David F. "An Empirical Investigation of the Relative
Performance Evaluation Hypothesis." Journal of Accounting
Res. 30 (Spring 1992): 53-69.
[21] Jensen, Michael, and Murphy, Kevin J. "CEO Incentives— 
It's Not How Much You Pay, but How." Harvard Bus. Rev.
68 (May-June 1990): 138-53. {a) "Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives." J.P.E. 98 (April 1990): 225-64. (b)
[22] Joh, Sung Wook. "Strategic Managerial Incentive
Compensation in Japan: Relative Performance Evaluation and
Product Market Collusion." Manuscript Albany: State Univ.
New York, May 1996.
[23] Kim, J., 1996. Additional evidence on relative performance
evaluation hypothesis, Working paper, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA.
[24] Koenker, Roger, and Bassett, Gilbert, Jr. "Robust Tests for
Heteroskedasticity Based on Regression Quantiles."
Econometrica 50 (January 1982): 43-61.
[25] Lambert, Richard A., and Larcker, David F. "An Analysis of 
the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance
in Executive Compensation Contracts." Journal of 
Accounting Res. 25 (suppl., 1987): 85-125.
[26] Murphy, Kevin J. (1999), “Executive Compensation,” in
Handbook of Labor Economics.
[27] Ashenfelter, Orley and David Card, eds. Volume 3.
[28] Paul Oyer, “Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No
Incentive Effects?” The Journal of Finance, Volume 59,
Number 4, August 2004 , pp. 1619-1650(32)
[29] Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. "A Survey of 
Corporate Governance." Journal of Finance 52 (June 1997):
737-83.
[30] Rajgopal S, Shevlin T, and Zamora V, “CEOs' Outside
Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative
Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts”, Journal
of Finance Volume 61 Issue 4 Page 1813-1844, August 2006
[31] Yermack, D., 1995. Do corporations award CEO stock
options effectively? Journal of Financial Economics 39, 237-
269.
APPENDIX
Table 1: Definition of Variables Used in the Empirical Tests
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
36
                                                            
 
        
 
 
          
 
 
        




International Journal of Management and Applied Science, ISSN: 2394-7926 Volume-3, Issue-2, Feb.-2017
http://iraj.in
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (all dollar values are in thousands)
Table 3 Regression Estimating the Impact of Firm Characteristics on RPE
Panel A. Regression Results
Competition, Relative Performance Evaluation, and Executive Compensation Contracts
37
                                                            
 
        
 
 
         















International Journal of Management and Applied Science, ISSN: 2394-7926 Volume-3, Issue-2, Feb.-2017
http://iraj.in
Table 3 (Continued) Regressions Estimating the Impact of Firm Characteristics on RPE
Panel B. Tests of Hypothesis (p-value in the bracket)
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